Two articles of interest in today's Wall Street Journal with indirect impact on the debate over the future of Internet policy. First, there's a front-page story ("Facing Budget Gaps, Cities Sell Parking, Airports, Zoo") documenting how many cities are privatizing various services -- including some considered "public utilities" -- in order to help balance budgets. The article worries about "fire-sale" prices and the loss of long-term revenue because of the privatizations. But the author correctly notes that the more important rationale for privatization is that, "In many cases, the private takeover of government-controlled industry or services can result in more efficient and profitable operations." Moreover, any concern about "fire-sale" prices and long-term revenue losses have to be stacked again the massive inefficiencies / costs associated with ongoing government management of resources /networks.

Of course, what's so ironic about this latest privatization wave is that it comes at a time when some regulatory activists are clamoring for more regulation of the Internet and calling for broadband to be converted into a plain-vanilla public utility. For example, Free Press founder Robert McChesney has argued that "What we want to have in the U.S. and in every society is an Internet that is not private property, but a public utility." That certainly doesn't seem wise in light of the track record of past experiments with government-owned or regulated utilities. And the fact that we are talking about something as complex and fast-moving as the Internet and digital networks makes the task even more daunting.

Government mismanagement of complex technology projects was on display in a second article in today's Journal ("U.S. Reviews Tech Spending.") Amy Schatz notes that "Obama administration officials are considering overhauling 26 troubled federal technology projects valued at as much as $30 billion as part of a broader effort by White House budget officials to cut spending. Projects on the list are either over budget, haven't worked as expected or both, say Office of Management and Budget officials." I'm pleased to hear that the Administration is taking steps to rectify such waste and mismanagement, but let's not lose sight of the fact that this is the same government that the Free Press folks want to run the Internet. Not smart.

I somehow missed this excellent ITIF paper by Robert D. Atkinson and George Ou when it came out at this point last year, but George has just dusted it off, made a couple of updates, and re-posted it over at the Digital Society blog. Worth reading. It touches on a lot of the same case studies I have been documenting in my ongoing series, "Problems in Public Utility Paradise." In particular, it focuses on the UTOPIA and iProvo fiascos out in Utah. Here's a key takeaway from those case studies:

The lessons learned in Utah is that projected uptake models and deployment plans don't always come to fruition, and when that happens the consequence is failure. For UTOPIA, the project was projected to reach 35% uptake rates by February 2008 but the reality was less than 17% uptake. UTOPIA had also hoped for 17% uptake from lucrative business customers but the reality was only 2 to 3 percent. Provo County's iProvo was hoping for 10,000 subscribers by July 2006 with the assumption that 75% of those customers would subscribe to lucrative triple play services, but the reality was 10,000 customers in late 2007 with only 17% of those customers subscribing to triple play. Many consumers were quite happy to subscribe to existing broadband cable or telecom providers. The consistent theme in Utah was an overestimation of the uptake rates and the underestimation of competition from incumbent cable operator Comcast and telecom operator Qwest which led to consistent underperformance.

Ouch. For more details, see this old essay of mine about UTOPIA from 2008, and this piece from last Sept about iProvo. Not a pretty picture. As I say every time I pen a piece about the latest muni failure du jour, these case studies should serve as a cautionary tale about the dangers of grandiose, centrally planned broadband schemes. There is no such thing as a free lunch. Network-building is hard, and politicians usually aren't that good at doing it.

As we've noted here before, municipal wi-fi experiments and local government fiber investments don't have a very impressive track record. The Philadelphia experiment, which I have discussed here before many times, has been particularly instructive. As Dan P. Lee documented in this spectacular Philadelphia magazine article last year, the city's subsidized wi-fi system, Wireless Philadelphia, was a political and technical fiasco of the highest order right from the start. It unraveled fairly quickly after its 2005 launch and now, according to The Philadelphia Business Journal:

The city of Philadelphia said Wednesday it intends to purchase, for $2 million, the wireless network constructed by EarthLink Inc. to turn the entire city into a Wifi hotspot. The city said it intends to exercise an option in an agreement signed in August to buy the network from Network Acquisition Co. LLC, which took the network over from Atlanta-based EarthLink in June 2008. The city said the purchase will be the first in a series of steps to create a wireless network it will use to enhance public safety, improve government efficiency and provide Internet access in targeted public places. The city said creating that network will require it to spend nearly $17 million over its 2011 through 2015 fiscal years. The money would go to building out both the core fiber network it already owns and the wireless mesh network it intends to purchase from Network Acquisition Co...

In other words, taxpayers are stuck picking up the tab for this failed experiment and now have to hope that the city can somehow manage it into profitability. Well, good luck with that. Even Karl Bode of Broadband Reports, someone who usually has nothing but nice things to say about Big Government high-tech projects and regulation, is forced to admit that the script for muni wi-fi paradise didn't quite play out as expected:

Network Acquisition Corporation purchased the network from Earthlink back in 2008, when Earthlink bailed (and we really mean bailed) on their muni-fi ambitions. The buyers briefly tinkered with free access and claimed they'd expand the network, but ultimately wound up being only a stepping stone between Earthlink and Philadelphia control. Philadelphia's use of Wi-Fi as a municipal efficiency and communications tool is a growing trend among cities, many of which found that broad, free Wi-Fi for all simply wasn't sustainable.

Do you mean to say that there is no such thing as a free lunch? I am shocked, shocked! Well, actually, I'm not.

[This is part of an ongoing series about "Problems in Public Utility Paradise."]

According to this recent article by Donald Meyers of the Salt Lake City Tribune, five candidates for mayor of Provo, Utah are falling all over themselves to declare their support for continuing the public utility fiasco that is iProvo, the city's fiber-to-the-home network. According to Wikipedia, it is the largest municipally-owned Fiber to the Home network in the United States." Steve Titch of the Reason Foundation, who has been following iProvo for many years, has documented its millions of dollars of losses and risk to taxpayers, saying "iProvo is a dismal financial failure by any standard." But that isn't stopping city officials and mayoral candidates from proposing to throw more money at this massive "if-you-build-it-they-will-come" fantasy. "One thing most of the candidates running for mayor agree on: iProvo is too important to fail, even if it means bailing out the company that bought it," Meyers reports. Here's the relevant passages from his article, with the key bits of bad info highlighted:

The city sold the troubled fiber-optic network to Broadweave Networks in 2008 in a deal in which Broadweave would take over the payments on the city's $39.6 million bond. Since November, Broadweave has had the city draw on its $6 million surety deposit to make its bond payments in a bid to build up cash to pay for growth.

In August, Veracity Communications merged with Broadweave, becoming Veracity Networks. The company's leaders, Drew Peterson and David Moon, have asked the city to restructure the payment schedule to allow the company to cut back on its payments for 18 months while it strengthens its coffers. It later would pay extra money over a seven-year period and reimburse the city with interest. Provo would draw on its Energy Department's reserves to make up the shortfall in bond payments -- $1.4 million.

Richard Bennett and Matt Sherman explain why it's a bad idea. (And here are a few of my old rants on the issue.)

Bennett:

If we've learned anything at all about from the history of Internet-as-utility, it's that this strained analogy only applies in cases where there is no existing infrastructure, and probably ends best when a publicly-financed project is sold (or at least leased) to a private company for upgrades and management. We should be suspicious of projects aimed at providing Wi-Fi mesh because they're slow as molasses on a winter's day.

I don't see any examples of long-term success in the publicly-owned and operated networking space. And I also don't see any examples of publicly-owned and operated Internet service providers doing any of the heavy lifting in the maintenance of the Internet protocols, a never-ending process that's vital to the continuing growth of the Internet.

Sherman:

Pursuing a public utility model while also desiring competition are fundamentally contradictory goals. Utilities are designed not to compete. Do you, or does anyone you know, have a choice of providers for water, sewage or electricity?

My second question would be: is there anyone in the technology world who sees public utilities as a model for innovation? A 1.5 megabit connection (T1) was an unimaginable luxury when I started in tech in the mid-90's. It was for well-funded companies only. Today, it is a low-end consumer connection and costs around 80% less. Has your sewage service followed a similar trajectory?

A public utility is designed to be "good enough" and little more. There is no need, and little room, for differentiation or progress. Your electricity service is essentially unchanged from 20 years ago, and will look the same 10 years from now. Broadband, on the other hand, requires constant innovation if we are to move forward -- and it has been delivering it, even if we desire more.

In my nearly 17 years of public policy work, I have never felt so vindicated about something as I did this weekend when I read Dan P. Lee's Philadelphia magazine feature on "Whiffing on Wi-Fi." It is a spectacularly well-written piece about the spectacular failure of Philadelphia's short-lived experiment with municipally-subsidized wi-fi, which was called Wireless Philadelphia. You see, back in April 2005, I wrote a white paper entitled "Risky Business: Philadelphia's Plan for Providing Wi-Fi Service," and it began with the following question: "Should taxpayers finance government entry into an increasingly competitive , but technologically volatile, business market?" In the report, I highlighted the significant risks involved here in light of how rapidly broadband technology and the marketplace was evolving. Moreover, I pointed to the dismal track record of previous municipal experiments in this field, which almost without exception ended in failure. I went on to argue:

Keeping these facts in mind, it hardly makes sense for municipal governments to assume the significant risks involved in becoming a player in the broadband marketplace. Even an investment in wi-fi along the lines of what Philadelphia is proposing, is a risky roll of the dice. [... ] the nagging "problem" of technological change is especially acute for municipal entities operating in a dynamic marketplace like broadband. Their unwillingness or inability to adapt to technological change could leave their communities with rapidly outmoded networks, and leave taxpayers footing the bill.

I got a stunning amount of hate mail and cranky calls from people after I released this paper. Everyone accused me of being a sock puppet for incumbent broadband providers or just not understanding the importance of the endevour. But as I told everyone at the time, I wasn't out to block Philadelphia from conducting this experiment, I just didn't think it had any chance of being successful. And, again, I tried to point out what a shame it would be if taxpayers were somehow stuck picking up the tab, or if other providers decided not to invest in the market because they were "crowded-out" by government investment in the field. But even I could have never imagined how quickly the whole house of cards would come crumbling down in Philadelphia. It really was an astonishing meltdown. Dan Lee's article makes that abundantly clear:

Boynton Beach, Florida's experiment with municipal wi-fi has ended. [Add it to the list of recent failures]. According to the South Florida Sun-Sentinel:

There's a roadblock in Boynton Beach's information superhighway. The city's Community Redevelopment Agency decided this month it has no more money for free wireless Internet service in its district. Boynton Beach was the first city in Palm Beach County to offer Wi-Fi three years ago. It operated 11 "hot spots," or access points, paying $44,000 annually for vendors to keep the system running. But the CRA dropped vendors who failed to meet their contracts. Other companies wanted to sell the Community Redevelopment Agency new equipment, but in a tough budget year, offering free wireless was no longer viable, said the agency's executive director, Lisa Bright. [...] "There is clearly no way for it to be a revenue generator at this time," Bright said. "It's premature for us to go to the next level."

Whenever I read one of these articles about the small town or mid-sized town wi-fi experiments failing so miserably I have to admit that I am a bit surprised. After all, many muni wi-fi supporters have argued that it is precisely in those communities where government support is most necessary and will be most likely to fill in gaps left by sporadic / delayed private broadband deployment. Frankly, I always thought this was the best argument for muni wi-fi and it's why I made sure to never go on record as opposing all government efforts, even though I am obviously a skeptic and don't like the idea of wagering taxpayer money on such risky ventures. (By contrast, I could just never see the reason for government subsidies of wi-fi ventures in major metro areas with existing private broadband operators. Like Philly and Chicago.) But the fact that many small town or mid-sized town wi-fi experiments are failing is really interesting because it must tell us something about either (a) the viability of the technology or (b) demand for such service. Now, many municipalization believers will just say that clearly (a) is the case and argue that we just need to wait for Wi-Max solutions to come online and then all will be fine. It certainly may be the case that Wi-Max will help boost coverage in low density areas, but is that really the end of the story? What about demand? What really makes me mad when I read most of these stories about current failed experiments is that they rarely give us any solid numbers about how many people utilized the services. To the extent any journalists or analysts are out there contemplating a story or study on this issue, I beg you to dig into the demand side of the equation and try to find out how much of the currently muni-wifi failure is due to technology and how much is due to demand, or lack thereof. Of course, government mismanagement could also be a culprit. But I suspect there is a far less demand for these services than supporters have estimated.

Portland's muni wi-fi experiment has failed. [Add it to the list of failures]. According to Broadband Reports, taxpayers are going to be on the line for $60K:

Portland had high hopes of being one of those cities where citywide wireless networks might actually work but those hopes did not pan out. Earlier this summer, Wi-Fi provider MetroFi announced that the company could not afford to continue operating the network there. Attempts to sell it off failed and the network was shut down. That's not the end of the story, though. In order to launch the network, MetroFi had to set up 600 (arguably unsightly) antennas throughout the city. The company had claimed that these antennas would be removed by the end of July but they remain up; MetroFi says that they still plan to follow through on removing them but city staff members report fears that the company is too strapped for cash to keep their end of this bargain. Estimates for removal are around $90,000; subtracting out a $30,000 bond for removal that was part of the MetroFi contract would still mean that Portland's taxpayers could pay up to $60,000 to get those antennas taken down.

Tim Wu has an absurd piece in today's New York Times comparing America's broadband marketplace to OPEC. This really is quite outrageous, beginning with the fact that OPEC is a GOVERNMENT-RUN cartel. Wu also had a comment in the Washington Post today saying that he didn't think broadband metering was an outrage. Well, that's nice. I'm happy that we have Tim's permission to experiment with new business models for financing broadband networks going forward!

This is indicative of what we can expect in the future once Net neutrality laws get on the books: A world of incessant "Mother may I?" permission-based forms of preemptive Internet regulation. Tim and his radical band of regulatory advocates over at Free Press will incessantly petition the FCC to review each and every business model decision and encourage the unelected bureaucrats at the agency to manage the Internet to their heart's content.

And what does Tim offer for an alternative vision of the way the world should work since he doesn't believe private markets can handle the job? Well, it's back to the Big Government drawing board for more tax-spend-and-subsidize solutions! "Amsterdam and some cities in Utah have deployed their own fiber to carry bandwidth as a public utility," he says. Yeah, that's the promised land. After all, it's working out soooooo well at the municipal level. Please.

Oakland Wireless appears to be in trouble. Add it to the list.

[Actually, is anyone out there keeping a running tally of the muni failures? If so, let me know so I can just start linking to it instead of all the random blog links. ]